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We show that the recent rise in Afghan opium production is caused by violent conflicts. 
Violence destroys roads and irrigation, crucial to alternative crops, and weakens local 
incentives to rebuild infrastructure and enforce law and order. Exploiting a unique data set, 
we show that Western hostile casualties, our proxy for conflict, have strong impact on 
subsequent local opium production. This proxy is shown to be exogenous to opium. We 
exploit the discontinuity at the end of the planting season: Conflicts have strong effects before 
and no effect after planting, assuring causality. Effects are strongest where government law 
enforcement is weak. 
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Opium production in Afghanistan has helped nance holy wars against Soviet occupation, violent
power contests among warlords, the rise of Taliban and its way to power, and the present resis-
tance against Western intervention. What is less well known is how conicts have spurred opium
production as well. This paper shows how the recent rise in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan
can be understood as a direct consequence of the rising violent conicts.
We think of this as a stark illustration of how war conditions are both destructive and
creative. Military actions destroy existing lines of production, and new illegal opportunities
arise as law enforcement becomes weaker. The traditional explanation for why the production
of illegal substances is so high in conict areas, however, focuses on drugs-for-arms strategies.
This explanation rests on centralized power within rebel organizations or governments, where
strongmen organize the growing of illegal substances to nance military campaigns.
We emphasize a reverse mechanism, what we call conict-induced narcotics production. It
rests on more fragmented power where local producers and leaders react to military activities
by raising drug production; not because they want to hoard cash to buy arms, but because the
production decisions reect a new social and economic situation, and a shorter time horizon. In
the case of Afghanistan, the key is the observation that opium cultivation requires a minimum of
investments and provides a maximum of economic turnover. These are desirable features under
the political instability generated by conict.
Why do production decisions change? Opium is more drought resistant than wheat, the
main alternative crop, and opium does not require road transportation. Military activities
that destroy infrastructure such as irrigation and roads therefore make opium relatively more
protable. Hence, farmers and local warlords shift to opium because it is less aected by the
ghting and can more easily be produced and sold in the new conict environment.
Violence and political instability also make it possible to ignore the law (large production
notwithstanding, opium has been illegal in Afghanistan since 1945 (UNODC, 1949)). As David
Keen (2000, p. 22) stresses, conicts should be regarded as \the emergence of an alternative
system of prot, power, and even protection." The social stigma attached to illegal activities
easily vanishes, expected punishment declines, and local protection is taken over by militia
leaders and warlords. A fragmented state enables warlords and local leaders to earn a living
by protecting poppy cultivators, opium traders, and laboratories. Faced with higher risks of
violence and hostile take-overs, local militia leaders also nd it less protable to rebuild destroyed
infrastructure, making conict-induced opium production persistent.
The soaring of opium production in recent years amounts to more than a doubling from 2002
to 2007. Since the physical conditions and climate are extremely well suited for opium production
in Afghanistan,1 a large change in opium production can come about by a small alteration in
incentives caused by conicts. The physical and social conditions for poppy cultivation and
heroin production constitute the opium curse of Afghanistan, we argue, where illegal displaces
legal production.2
To empirically test the main mechanism of how violent conicts induce subsequent opium
1Average yield in Afghanistan is about 40 kg/ha compared to for instance only about 10 kg/ha in Burma,
the former major global producer of illicit opium (UNODC, 2008). In Indian test stations, which generally have
much higher yields than an average farmer, yields of a maximum of 60 kg/ha have been obtained (Kapoor, 1995,
p. 66).
2This is a variant of the \resource curse" (see e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997, 2001). In general, the
resource curse can be a misnomer. In most cases it is the combination of bad institutions and \lootable" resource
rents that leads to these kinds of development failures (Mehlum et al., 2006). The problem in Afghanistan is
not the resources or high productivity of opium per se, but rather the circumstances for resource rent extraction.
In fact, the whole Afghan opium trade becomes so valuable just because the country has such bad institutions.
Institutions that obeyed international conventions would restrict opium production to legal medical use.
2production, we have gathered a unique data set with information from the 329 Afghan districts
from 2001 to 2007 on areas under opium cultivation and the localization of conict. To measure
violent conicts, we use information on the occurrence of Western hostile casualties. Typically,
hostile casualties occur when soldiers are killed in operations that destroy infrastructure in
contested areas. The well-known Operation Medusa in 2006 is a clear example: 20 NATO
soldiers died as they were throwing grenades into wells and through doors in a Taliban stronghold
where NATO forces controls 2/3 of the area (the incident is further discussed in Section 4).
Clearly, hostile casualties are associated with material destruction, political risk, declining law
enforcement and, as we demonstrate, rising opium production. But how do we know which
way causality runs|and thus that a substantial part of the rise in opium production is conict-
induced?
Before 2001 there are no consistent conict data, but we provide a brief historical account
of how the outbreak of non-opium conicts spurred opium cultivation. From 2001 onward we
have information on casualties in NATO's ISAF forces and US forces in Operation Enduring
Freedom. To minimize the endogeneity problem, we do not attempt to use information on
Afghan casualties as these may stem from conicts over control of opium elds. We document
below that the Western forces are not involved in poppy eradication or other actions against
narcotics production, both from the forces' mandates and by documenting a lack of correlation
between Western casualties and opium eradication. Both clearly indicate that our measure of
conict is exogeneous to opium production.
Our regressions show that there is a strong positive relationship between Western casualties
and subsequent opium production. We also undertake a number of tests to verify that the
line of causality indeed goes from conict to opium production. First, we compare the impacts
of ghting on opium production just before and just after the planting season. There is a
clear discontinuity: only conict before the planting season has an impact on production. The
direction of causality is also conrmed by a Granger causality test|conict in one year induces
opium production in the next, whereas opium production in one year does not induce ghting
the year after.
To further check for simultaneity biases we instrument opium production by deviations from
normal rainfall. This exercise indicates that there is no causal link from opium production to
conict, and hence that the correlation must be driven by conict leading to opium production.
To test for whether opium production could be caused by the mere presence of Western soldiers,
and not by ghting in itself, we compare the eect of hostile and non-hostile casualties on
poppy cultivation. Hostile casualties have a strong eect whereas non-hostile casualties have no
eect. Finally, we show that the eect of conict on opium production is much lower when law
enforcement is good, supporting our assertion that conict-induced narcotics production relies
on institutional failure.
In a number of countries there is correlation between violent conict and drugs production.
The small literature that explores the links between conict and drugs emphasizes the role of civil
war and how drugs production help nance rebellion activity|what we denote drugs-for-arms
strategies. The identication of a positive eect of coca production on conicts in Colombia is
derived convincingly by Angrist and Kugler (2008). They explore variations across regions of
how an exogenous increase in coca prices aects rebellion activities. Cornell (2005) provides a
further survey of some other case studies.
The link between conict and local economic activities is also the topic of two recent papers
by Dube and Vargas (2008) and Hidalgo et al. (forth.). Dube and Vargas (2008) investigates
how dierent types of price shocks give rise to subsequent violent conicts in Colombia: A
price drop in a labor-intensive activity works through the local labor market by lowering the
opportunity cost of joining the militia; a price increase of capital-intensive goods works through
the gains from rent appropriation. Similarly, Hidalgo et al. (forth.) shows that adverse economic
3shocks cause the rural poor to invade large land holdings in Brazil, and that this eect is more
pronounced in areas where the inequality in land holdings is high.
All these contributions consider the eects of economic shocks on subsequent conict. Our
mechanism, however, highlights the eects of conict shocks on subsequent economic activity.
Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) take a similar point of view in their exploration of how violence
aect the value of rms extracting \conict diamonds" in Angola. Although the literature cited
above demonstrates that we cannot rule out the link from economic shocks to conicts, the
novelty of our paper is the reverse eect|what we denote conict-induced narcotics production.
This eect is hardly discussed in the literature.3 Our eorts are thus particularly oriented
toward demonstrating empirically the eect of conict shocks on economic activity, for the case
of Afghanistan.
In Section 2 we provide a brief overview of the background of opium in Afghanistan empha-
sizing how large increases follow the outbreak of serious conicts. Section 3 provides a simple
model that highlights the main mechanisms behind the association between conicts and opium
cultivation. Section 4 contains our empirical ndings and a number of tests for causality and
robustness. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
Afghanistan's dominant role in the world opium production does not go back more than three
decades, as can be seen from Table 1.4 The low initial production may seem puzzling as the
favorable physical circumstances for growing and processing opium seem to have been almost the
same for decades. The soil and climate conditions t well with opium production. Opium poppies
can grow almost everywhere in Afghanistan. The cultivation requires a factor endowment of
much labor5 and little land, which ts the Afghan situation. In addition, dried raw opium
takes up little space relative to its value. It can easily be stored and kept as savings, and can
readily be exchanged even in times of serious conicts. The processing and transport facilities
seem to be largely unaected by war conditions. The process of transforming raw opium to
heroin is also fairly simple requiring only commonly available chemicals and a rudimentary
laboratory.6 These laboratories can easily be established and operated. Today Afghanistan has
a large number of them. Most of the laboratories are small and family run, producing about
10kg per day (UNODC, 2003, p. 139f). Some are even mobile, which is particularly important
in areas with violent conicts and contested power.
Since these physical circumstances have been the same for decades, an explanation for the
shift in opium production must be sought in the social and economic conditions. We assert that
it is the emergence of an alternative system of prot, power and protection, associated with
increasing conicts, that explains the rise in opium production. Looking back over the recent
three decades, signicant increases in opium production follow outbreaks of serious conicts.
The rst signicant shift in poppy cultivation came after the Soviet occupation in 1979
(UNODC, 2003, p. 89). The uprising against the Soviets was not a reaction by the state elite
3The only paper we are aware of is the study of coca production in Colombia by D az and S anches (2004).
Their mechanism is that an increase in the power and territorial control of the rebel groups lead to a rise in coca
production, since only rebel groups produce coca. Economic agendas in civil wars are also discussed in an edited
volume by Mats Berdal and David Malone (2000)
4The table is compiled from dierent sources and hence the gures are not necessarily directly comparable.
The upward trend, however, is very clear.
5To collect the opium from the poppy, the pod of the plant has to be cut, a procedure known as lancing. As
all the poppies do not mature at the same time, the farmer has to go over the same area several times lancing
the mature pods. Once a pod has been cut open, the opium oozes out and is collected. This process is repeated
until the plant stops yielding.
6See e.g. Booth (1996, 77f) for details of the process.









Notes: Production in metric tonnes.
Source: CCINC (1972); UNODC (2003, 2007)
in Kabul. The old regime lacked the organizational base to lead any popular movement. It
favored small local power holders, mainly landlords and khans, and the uprising against the
Soviets \started as a mass-based movement [...] without any unied national leadership" (Ru-
bin, 2002, pp. 184-5). Opium prots played an essential role in the uprising. As one observer
remarks, \Soviet invasion of the country threw the society into chaos, and gave rise to ineectual
governments lacking control over the whole territory. This prompted unscrupulous warlords to
take advantage of the situation by encouraging farmers to shift to poppy cultivation" (Misra,
2004, p. 127). Similarly, Rashid (2000, p. 119) concludes that \[e]ver since 1980, all the Muja-
heddin warlords had used drugs money to help fund their military campaigns and line their own
pockets". There are indications that covert US operations helped boost both the production of
opium and smuggling of heroin through Pakistan (McCoy, 1991; Haq, 1996), and the occupa-
tion also brought Russian criminals into the drug networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This
facilitated exports of opium to far o countries, and Afghan heroin was now smuggled through
Central Asia, Russia, the Baltic countries and nally into Europe (Rashid, 2000, p. 120).
After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, and in particular after the fall of Najibullah's regime in
1992, warlords who earlier were unied against the Russians started to ght each other. It was a
violent power struggle with shifting alliances between ethnic groups and between local comman-
ders. Amalendu Misra (2004, p. 52) claims that between 1992 and 1996 \every major group had
both allied with and fought against every other major group at one time or another" (see also
Giustozzi, 2000; Kaplan, 2001). At the same time agriculture and trade revived. But \[m]uch
of this renewed production took the form of opium growing, heroin rening, and smuggling;
these enterprises were organized by combines of mujahidin parties, Pakistani military ocers,
and Pakistani drug syndicates." (Rubin, 2002, p. 183). The acceleration of opium production
around 1989 is also noted by UNODC (2003, p. 90). Poppy cultivation in Pakistan was dramat-
ically reduced as the government started to ght the narcotics Maa that had developed in the
Pakistani armed forces. Warlords in Afghanistan took over the production.
When Taliban entered the scene in 1994, it acted as other warlords when it came to opium
production. According to Rashid (2000), the area for poppy cultivation was expanded and new
trade and transport routes were established as Taliban fought its way to power. Taliban also
extracted parts of the opium prots through levying the traditional ushr and zakat taxes on
the opium traders (UNODC, 2003, p. 92). The taxes on opium production were interpreted as
a sign of its religious and political acceptance.
After the US intervention in 2001 joined by NATO forces, opium production has been on
a dramatic rise. Since 2002 until today it has more than doubled, see Figures 1 and 2.7 In
7The extremely low level of opium production in 2001 is due to the Taliban's enforced ban on poppy cultivation





























































































1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 2004 2007
Year
Production, Afghanistan Production, world total
Wholesale price, Europe Wholesale price, US
Notes: Wholesale price is in 2006 US $ / gram. Opium production is \Potential opium pro-
duction" in metric tons, as measured by UNODC (2008). Since 2000, the only competitor to
Afghan opium is opium from Myanmar. During the 90's, also Lao PDR, Pakistan, Vietnam,
Mexico, and Colombia produced noticeable amounts of opium. Source: UNODC (2008).
the Figures, we see that Afghanistan currently produces more than 90 per cent of the world's
illicit production of opium. Alongside the expansion of Afghani opium production over the last
15 years, wholesale prices have plummeted both in Europe and the US. Figure 2 also plots the
number of Western casualties who died in hostile encounters in the period 2001 to 2007. Already
here we see that there is a strong correlation between the two time-series. At this level, however,
it is not possible to say anything about causation. In the empirical part of this paper, we will
use disaggregated data on Western casualties and opium production gures from UNODC to
investigate the relationship between conict and opium production more thoroughly.
3 Conict-induced opium: the mechanisms
Opium and wheat are the main alternative crops for farmers in Afghanistan. The cultivation
of the two crops dier systematically, in that wheat production in Afghanistan is much more
dependent on proper infrastructure than opium. In a joint study by the World Bank and
UNODC, Martin and Symansky (2006, p. 26) conclude that
\Opium is relatively drought-resistant, making its cultivation easier than wheat in
areas where irrigation is limited. Moreover, dry opium is easy to store and transport,
this year. The ban is thoroughly discussed in Farrell and Thorne (2005) and the rest of the articles in the Special
Focus issue on Taliban and Opium in the International Journal of Drug Policy (Volume 16, issue 2, 2005).































































































1994 1997 2001 2004 2007
Year
Notes: Bars depict hectares of land devoted to opium production and the line depicts hostile
casualties. The extremely low level of opium production in 2001 is due to the Taliban's ban on
poppy cultivation in this year (see discussion and references in footnote 7).
Source: UNODC (2007) and iCasualties.org.
which, given the poor state of roads and stocking facilities in Afghanistan, gives it
an advantage over other crops."8
We incorporate these dierences in a highly stylized model that focuses on the relationship
between a local leader, called the warlord,9 and local farmers (sharecroppers or smallholders). In
the model three interrelated decisions are highlighted. First, the warlord decides on investments
in infrastructure, such as irrigation, local roads, and storing facilities for agricultural products.
Second, the warlord or his associates oer a price per kg raw opium to farmers. Third, each
plot of land is divided between wheat and opium cultivation either by the farmer or the warlord,
depending on the strength of warlord control in the area.
Both land ownership and warlord dominance vary across farms and districts. As Manseld
(2001, 2004, 2005) has convincingly emphasized, the group of poppy cultivators in Afghanistan
is rather heterogeneous as it diers in holdings of assets and in dependence on land owners and
warlords. The concept of an idealized representative farmer is therefore misleading; We aim at
8Similar points have been made by Barth (2008, pp. 44-45) and UNODC (2003, p. 89 and p. 99).
9Many Taliban leaders should be considered regular warlords. Several Taliban leaders in fact have a background
as warlords. The legendary warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani, for instance, \a hero to the CIA and wealthy Arab backers
during the ght against the Soviet invaders", and by many considered to be un-Islamic, is currently the principal
military commander of the Taliban (quote from Independent, 2008). For more on the neo-Taliban insurgency, see
Giustozzi (2007).
7a set up that in a simple way delievers results that are robust to variations in local power and
land ownership.10
3.1 Basic model of production
In all cases we consider, the farmer has access to a plot of land suitable for growing both wheat
and opium as cash crops.
Wheat
Let Ft indicate marketable wheat production in period t,11 and let kt indicate the level of
infrastructure such as irrigation, roads, and storage facilities in the local community. The
farmer is assumed to have enough household labor to cultivate wheat eciently on the entire
plot. The productivity per hectare is f(kt), where f is increasing and concave. Total production
of wheat on the plot is thus
Ft = f(kt)(1   nt)
The income from wheat production depends on land ownership and control. If the warlord owns
the land, he obtains his share L of the wheat production, and the farmer obtains his share
F = 1 L. If the farmer owns the land, his share is F = 1 and the warlord obtains no rents
from wheat production. If neither the warlord nor the farmer owns the land, F +L < 1. Any
use of hired labor is covered by F of the production value.
Opium
Let Gt indicate opium production in period t. Opium's robustness against drought, irregular
irrigation, and lack of transport and storing facilities means that opium production is less de-
pendent on the quality of the infrastructure kt than wheat. We capture this by simply assuming
that the production of opium is independent of infrastructure.12 It is, however, much more labor
intensive to cultivate opium than wheat, see e.g. footnote 5 above. With a given household labor,
the farmer therefore has decreasing returns in opium production since the opium production per
hectare land declines as his poppy eld expands. To capture the decreasing returns to scale,
combined with the sensible conditions that the marginal productivity of the rst parcel of land
is positive but nite, and that with no land devoted to opium there is no yield, we postulate the
following production function
Gt = (nt +  n)
    n with  < 1;  n  0;
where  n determines the initial marginal productivity, since the marginal productivity of the rst
parcel is ( n)
 1. With  n = 0, the function collapses to a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function.
10 UNODC (2004) report that in the 2003-2004 season, 87 % of poppy growers and 81 % of non-poppy growers
decided what to plant on their own. There is some geographical variation, however, a larger proportion of farmers
do not decide what to plant on their own in the south than in the rest of the country. Land ownership also varies
across the country, although the vast majority of farmers own the land they farm. Sharecropping is more common
in the North Eastern and Eastern regions (UNODC, 2004, Table 23). In some parts of the literature the role
of the traditional credit system, salaam, is also emphasized as a stimulant to opium production. This is further
discussed in Willumsen (2006), who nds that the empirical support for this is limited to a small group of farmers
who devote all their land to poppy cultivation.
11Clearly, most Afghani farmers also produce wheat for own subsistence consumption which is neither dependent
on roads nor on storing facilities. Therefore we should think of Ft as cash crops cultivated beyond subsistence
levels.
12The conclusions we draw are only dependent on an assumption that the elasticity of opium production with
respect to infrastructure kt is suciently low relative to that of wheat production.
8The income from opium cultivation is divided between the farmer, the traders, and the
warlord. The traders work under warlord protection, and we treat them as his close associates
without a separate role in the model. The income of the warlord is thus the dierence between
the selling price of opium Pt at the border and the price pt of buying opium at the farm gate.
The farmer obtains the farm gate price pt per kg raw opium that he produces.
While the share that the warlord may obtain from wheat production is given by old customs
and conventions, the warlord and his associates simply set the farm gate price pt. Thus the
warlord has more power over the opium trade than over the wheat trade. His power, however,
may be constrained by governmental law enforcement (or the quality of institutions), modeled
by the parameter t  1, where 1   t can be thought of as the probability of conscation or
eradication of the opium production. More generally, a higher level of t captures a situation
where local leaders and farmers more safely can ignore the law. Thus, a high t captures
condence in a local system of power and protection.
To sum up, with a wheat price normalized to 1, the expected prots accruing to the warlord
L and the farmer F in period t can be expressed as follows
L = t(Pt   pt)Gt + LFt
F = tptGt + FFt
To capture the heterogeneity in power structures across Afghanistan, we consider two ways of
determining nt and pt, imperfect and complete warlord control, both for a given level of kt.
3.2 Imperfect versus complete warlord control
Imperfect warlord control
The most common case is when the farmer decides the allocation of land between opium nt
and wheat (1   nt). As stated in footnote 10, almost 90 per cent of Afghan farmers claim that
they have this independence. Yet, the warlord treats his poppy cultivators as his hirelings. The
warlord sets an eort-inducing price pt and let the farmer decide how much to produce. In this
sense the warlord resembles the putter-out merchant of the early textile industry in England.
David Landes (1969) describes how \the artisan found himself bound to the merchant who
supplied his raw materials and sold his nished work" (p. 43).13 Hence, we have
L(kt) = max
pt
ft(Pt   pt)[(nt +  n)
    n] + Lf(kt)(1   nt)g
s.t. nt = n(pt;kt;t)  argmax
nt
F
where F = tpt [(nt +  n)    n] + Ff(kt)(1   nt)
We rst determine the allocation of land for a given farm gate price pt. Solving the farmer's












1     n if pt >
Ff(kt)
t  n1  (1)
The fraction of land nt used for opium cultivation is increasing in the price pt that the landlord
oers and in the condence in local protection . Also, if  n is suciently large relative to the
farm-gate price pt and the protability of wheat Lf(kt), the farmer prefers to produce no
13Landes also observed how the artisans were \caught on a treadmill of debt|his nished work mortgaged in
advance to his creditor" (p. 43). Similarly Manseld (2001) emphasizes the role of the credit system salaam in
his description of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.
9opium. If we allowed  n and  to vary between farmers and districts, capturing the heterogeneity
in circumstances among farmers emphasized by e.g. Manseld (2001, 2004, 2005), the model
can account for the fact that only a fraction of farmers produce opium. If law enforcement is
strong (low ), the farm gate price of opium that the warlord must pay in order to induce poppy
cultivation can be prohibitively high.
For simplicity, we from now on focus on the case where n(pt;kt;t) > 0. The fraction of land
dedicated to opium production nt is declining in the opportunity costs of opium production|the
farmers' share of the wheat productivity Ff(kt) relative to the land productivity of opium .
Next, we nd the prot maximizing price pt that the warlord oers:
pt =
Pt
L=F + 1=   [(1   )=][ n=(nt +  n)]
 (2)
When  n = 0, the Cobb-Douglas case, the optimal farm gate price pt is a mark-down of the selling
price Pt, where the mark-down is a constant 1=(1=+L=F) < 1. It is a constant because the
supply of land for opium has constant elasticity. Thus, in this case the price pt is independent
of conict-related destruction of infrastructure kt and condence in local protection t; such
changes show up solely as quantity eects: Opium production goes up and wheat production
declines. When  n > 0, the price also depend positively on infrastructure kt and negatively on
the condence in illegality t via nt. We then easily see that nt, the amount of land dedicated to
opium production, is decreasing in infrastructure kt and increasing in the condence in illegality
t.14
Complete warlord control
The second case is when the warlord has complete control over both the allocation of labor nt
and the opium price to the farmer pt, but he faces the participation constraint of giving the
farmer at least c. The warlord's problem becomes
L(kt) =max
pt;nt
[t(Pt   pt)[(nt +  n)    n] + Lf(kt)(1   nt)] s.t. F  c
The warlord chooses nt to maximize production, and then pt to satisfy the participation con-










c   Ff(kt)(1   nt)
t [(nt +  n)
    n]
Again, conict-related destruction of infrastructure kt and the corresponding rise of condence
in illegality t have direct quantity eects: Opium production goes up and wheat production
goes down. The farm-gate opium price also varies with kt and t, as the price is set at the lowest
level that satises the participation constraint.
14We have two equations, (1) and (2), that determine pt and nt for every level of kt. Inserting nt in (2) and



















103.3 Investments in infrastructure
The determination of kt is analogue in both cases considered above. Recall that constructing
and maintaining irrigation and other important infrastructures is normally controlled by the
warlord, and that the warlord's incentives depend on the degree to which his power is contested.
The warlord decides on kt taking into account the prots he receives from the agricultural pro-
duction (both wheat and opium) and the risk he faces of being overthrown|either by competing
warlords, by the Kabul government, or by Western forces. Overthrown, the warlord would not
be able to keep any locally invested assets. One reason could be that the new power holder
considers the warlord's property illegitimate.
The value of the power position of a warlord with a level of infrastructure kt, is denoted by
V (kt). This value can be expressed as
V (kt) = max
kt+1
fL(kt) + kt(1   )   kt+1 + (1   )V (kt+1)g (3)
where  is the discount factor of the warlord,  is the depreciation rate of infrastructure (or, if one
like, the rate of expected destruction in low level conicts), and  denotes the probability that
the warlord is overthrown in the next period. Note that we have normalized the continuation
value of the state in which the warlord has been overthrown to 0, and that we assume this to
be an absorbing state.
To nd the eects of conict on the long term development of infrastructure, we solve
(3) with the relevant expression of L(kt), which again depends on the warlord's power over
the allocation of land dedicated to opium production nt. The rst order condition for the
maximization problem can be written (1 )V 0(kt+1) = 1, while the envelope condition states






  (1   ) (4)
With a per period risk of being overthrown equal to , the warlord's expected length in power is
equal to 1=. Thus, when conicts become more likely, the expected horizon becomes shorter,
and the warlord invest less in infrastructure (as he would in any other local asset where his
property right depends on his incumbency). A higher conict risk  therefore leads to a lower
level of infrastructure kt, which again leads to higher opium production. Similarly, when conicts
are expected to destroy future infrastructure (i.e.  is high), we see from (4) that the warlord
initiates less rebuilding of infrastructure today.
3.4 Opium and conict
In sum, our model shows:
Proposition 1. The factors (a) destruction of infrastructure (lower kt), (b) condence in local
protection and low fear of external law enforcement (higher t), and (c) political instability
(higher ) all lead to a rise in opium production, irrespective of land ownership and of who
decides what crop to cultivate.
Intuitively, the destruction of infrastructure erodes the protability of wheat as a cash crop,
and thus lowers the opportunity costs of opium production. Lower opportunity costs mean
higher opium production. The rise in illegal opportunities caused by weaker law enforcement
t also stimulates opium production directly for every level of infrastructure kt. Those who are
involved in the trade expect to obtain more of the opium prots, as they feel more condent
that they are protected against eradication and conscation of prots. Hence, there is a comple-
mentarity between creation and destruction: When law enforcement declines at the same time
as infrastructure is destroyed, the rise in opium production becomes particularly high.
11The parameters  and  capture related aspects of secure power and property rights.  is
included to capture the impact of variations in law enforcement for a given level of k, while
 is included to capture more long run perspectives, i.e. the warlord's political risk of being
overthrown. An increase in political risk  leads the warlord to invest less in infrastructure, as
his expected capital loss goes up with higher risk of conict. Through the channels discussed in
Proposition 1, this induces more opium cultivation by the farmers. The higher level of opium
production means that the opportunity costs of investing in infrastructure rises even further.
It should also be noticed that a politically strong warlord who has incomplete control over
farmers and who obtains a low share of legal agricultural rents, can be particularly bad for
economic development. When the farmer has power to decide what to grow, the warlord must
create bad opportunities for wheat production in order to induce the farmer to choose opium,
from which the warlord benets the most. Hence, higher political instability (higher  caused by
increasing conicts), strong underdevelopment, and high opium production go together as the
warlord would like to allocate more labor to opium production than the farmers would choose
themselves.
4 Conict-induced opium: The magnitudes
In our model, conict has three important properties that link it to subsequent opium produc-
tion: Destruction of infrastructures kt, increased condence in illegality t, and higher political
risk . We do not attempt to estimate separate eects of the three. Instead, we proxy for a com-
bination of these by Western soldiers observed dying in hostile combats. The three characteristics
are jointly observed in most battles: Soldiers are killed, the operations destroy infrastructure,
and it takes place in contested areas. For instance, on the 12th day of Operation Medusa,
NATO's largest oensive in Afghanistan, The Times reports that
\Heavy gates to walled compounds were blown open, a warren of Taleban tunnels
and bunkers were destroyed by explosives and grenades were thrown into wells and
red through doors [...] But it is gruelling, dangerous work. At least 20 Nato troops
have been killed in the battle, and [...] Nato claimed to be in control of only 65 per
cent of the Panjawyi area". (The Times, 2006)
We focus on the link from conict to opium production. As indicated above, however, we
have no reason to rule out a link from opium to conicts. Yet, the novelty of our paper is conict-
induced opium production, and our eorts are particularly oriented toward demonstrating this
empirically. Clearly, this also indicates that we have to confront some endogeneity problems.
4.1 Data and empirical strategy
Obviously, to test the mechanism we need exogenous variation in conict. There is no data on
the direct amount of ghting available. One approach could be to use the number of combat
activities by year, but data on such events are scarce and mostly based on media coverage. Also,
these data have not been coded so far. More importantly, basing our empirical inference on data
like these would lead us into severe endogeneity issues, as all internal power struggles between
dierent warlords and traders over future opium production would lead us to conclude that
ghting causes opium production, although in this case the causality would go the other way
around. Instead, we base our measure of conict on casualties from hostile encounters involving
Western ISAF forces or US forces in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Afghani casualties
are not available, but Western casualties are. The placement of Western forces is arguably more
exogenous relative to opium production than more general data on where ghting occurs.
12As claimed above, Western ISAF forces do not involve themselves in ghting related to opium
production. This is made clear on their web site:
\While supporting the Afghan government counter-narcotics programmes is an ISAF
key supporting task, ISAF is not directly involved in poppy eradication, nor does it
participate in the destruction of processing facilities, or in any military action against
narcotic producers",15
and in the description of their mandate:
\ISAF aims at: [...] provide support to the Afghan government and internationally-
sanctioned counter-narcotics eorts through intelligence-sharing and the conduct of
an ecient public information campaign, as well as support to the Afghan National
Army Forces conducting counter-narcotics operations. ISAF, however, is not directly
involved in the poppy eradication or destruction of processing facilities, or in taking
military action against narcotic producers".16
Neither have US soldiers focused on ghting drugs: \until recently, American ocials acknowl-
edge, ghting drugs was considered a distraction from ghting terrorists." (New York Times,
2007). According to the same article, the Taliban oensive in the spring of 2006 and especially
the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in December 2006, led to a change in
attitude among defense ocials on the role of opium in funding the insurgency. Since the change
of strategy was around the turn of the year 2006-7, we avoid using data on casualties for 2007
to predict opium production in 2008.
To verify that Western soldiers are really not involved in opium eradication, we use data on
the area of opium eradicated for 2006 and 2007 from UNODC (2006, 2007). If we are not able
to reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between eradication and Western casualties (the
data on conict are presented below), this is a strong indication that the conict variable we use
is exogenous to opium production. The eradication is led by the Afghan government, and the
gures on the size of the eradicated areas are veried by the UNODC. Unfortunately we have
not been able to nd veried gures on eradication from before 2006.
The contemporaneous correlation between casualties and area eradicated in 2006 and 2007
can be found in Table 2. As seen from columns (1) and (2), there is no correlation between
eradication and casualties in 2006. In 2007, the correlation is stronger but still not statistically
signicant, see columns (3) and (4). The reason for showing the regressions by year, and not
pooling the observations across the two years,17 is that, according to the New York Times (2007)
quote cited above, the American soldiers changed their strategy from 2006 to 2007. Clearly, the
ndings in Table 2 are very much in line with the quotes from the New York Times (2007):
also in the data there seems to be evidence of a change in the US strategy from 2006 to 2007.
Again, due to this change of strategy we avoid using data on casualties for 2007 to predict opium
production in 2008.
The data on conict are drawn from iCasualties.org, which base their data mostly on press
releases from the US Department of Defense and CENTCOM.18 This database lists every ca-
sualty by name, cause of death, and location. We separate between hostile and non-hostile
casualties, and use the reported location to measure casualties by district. Some casualties are
15http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/cn.html, accessed on Aug. 28, 2008.
16http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/index.html, accessed on Aug. 28, 2008.
17The results from pooling the data across the two years are qualitatively the same as the ones given in Table
2: We cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no correlation between conict and eradication (p-value of 0.232
and 0.169 for resp. with and without control for lagged opium production).
18This is the same source used by Greenstone (2007) and Iyengar and Monten (2008) to measure casualties in
Iraq.
13Table 2: Correlation between eradication of opium and Western hostile casualties in 2006 and
2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Casualties, district 14.25 -12.92 177.8 157.0
(34.69) (31.65) (124.0) (116.6)
Opium production, lagged 0.0506** 0.0230
(0.0235) (0.0147)
Constant 29.61** 15.85* 25.64** 16.21*
(10.95) (8.557) (9.729) (9.417)
Year 2006 2006 2007 2007
R2 0.001 0.075 0.083 0.111
N 329 329 329 329
Notes: Contemporaneous correlation between the area of opium eradicated and Western combat
casualties. Both eradicated area and casualties are measured on the district level.
Standard errors are clustered on province-year
not reported with a suciently precise location to code their district. These are coded at the
province level, so we have somewhat richer data on the province level.
The casualties data are very skewed, mostly since in one encounter there may be several
Western casualties. We have therefore chosen to focus on a dummy for whether there were
casualties or not in a given area.19 The reason for this is twofold. First, as we do not observe
the exact location of death for all the casualties in our data set, focusing on a dummy for
conict minimizes measurement error if the reporting of the exact location is correlated with
other characteristics of the area where the conict took place. Second, it is not obvious that the
number of casualties in an area is a good indicator of the seriousness of the conict in that area.
An illustrating example is a shot-down helicopter: This causes a large number of casualties, but
the number of casualties does not necessarily indicate that the conict is more serious than a
single solders dying on the ground while ghting. The localization of districts where Western
casualties have been reported and the average measured production of opium is shown in Figure
3.
Opium production is based on data from the United Nations Oce on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC, 2007), that has surveyed opium production in Afghanistan since 1994. Their approach
was initially based on surveying opium production in a number of villages and then aggregating.
From 2002, parts of the data are instead based on satellite imagery, using dierences in spectral
reectance of dierent crops to identify the area under opium cultivation. This is combined with
annual eld surveys to determine yields. See UNODC (2007) for further details of the survey
methodology.
We also add data on monthly precipitation by district to be used as an instrument for
opium production. These data are drawn from the Global Precipitation Climatology Project
One-Degree Daily Precipitation Data Set,20 that provides data on daily precipitation on a 11
degree level. The observations are rst interpolated by kriging,21 and averages are then taken
for each district.
19Using the actual number of casualties gives similar results. The exception is the Granger test in Table 5,
where some of the standard errors increase somewhat.
20Available from http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/gpcp/1dd/
21Using a spherical semivariogram. For details on kriging, see e.g. Chil es and Delner (1999)
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Note: District with ghting in at least one year are hatched.
4.2 Findings
In this section we provide our main estimates of the eect of (violent) conict on subsequent
opium production. The core results are shown in Table 3, which shows the results of regressing
opium production on contemporaneous and lagged conict with and without one- and two-way
xed eects. From Figure 2, it is clear that spurious results may arise if we do not take into
account the trending in the level of both conict and opium production. Consequently, most
of our specications include period dummies, which also accounts for changes in national and
international policies, world market prices of opium, etc. We also control for district xed eects,
so variables such as the quality of the soil, ethnicity, former Taliban control and so do not drive
the results.
The strongest test of our hypothesis is Column (6) of Table 3, where we estimate a strong
and highly signicant eect of lagged conict on subsequent opium production at the district
level, even after controlling for district and year xed eects and contemporaneous conicts.
It is important to note that the identication in this table is based on two-way xed eects,
i.e. we assume that, conditional on the other right-hand-side variables and the xed eects, the
placement of the soldiers is exogenous to opium production. We have argued that this is a
reasonable assumption in Section 4.1, based on ocial and unocial US and NATO statements
and the fact that eradication measures are uncorrelated with Western casualties. The rest of
this section provides tests dedicated to checking whether the estimated relationships in Table 3
are causal. The estimated relationships in Table 3 passes all these test by a clear margin, and
together these ndings clearly show that there is a causal link from conict to poppy cultivation.
15Table 3: Eects of Western combat casualties on opium production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Casualties, district 969.6* 565.2*
(519.6) (305.1)
Casualties, district lagged 771.1** 490.8** 368.3*** 392.8***
(351.2) (197.6) (141.5) (144.6)
Casualties, district two lags 229.7 -119.7
(231.2) (314.2)
District FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.028 0.011 0.001 0.007 0.034 0.040
N 2303 1974 1645 1974 1974 1645
Notes: Eects of contemporaneous and lagged Western combat casualties on opium production
(2001-2007). Casualties on district level.
Standard errors are clustered on province-year
District level estimates
Table 3 shows results from regressions at the district level. Our claim is that conicts stimulate
poppy cultivation. Column (1) shows that there is a strong, positive, and signicant contempo-
raneous correlation between casualties and opium production. However, as the planting season
starts in October (UNODC, 2003, p. 31), one-year lagged eects of casualties on opium produc-
tion seem to be a better test of our hypothesis of a positive relationship between conict and
opium production. From Column (2) we see that there is a strong and positive eect of one-year
lagged casualties on opium production, and this holds even when we control for district xed
eects (Column (4)), year and district xed eects (two-way xed eects, Column (5)), and two-
way xed eects together with contemporaneous and two-year lagged casualties (Column (6)).
The estimated coecients are large. Using specication (5), where we have the lowest estimate,
going from no conict to conict is estimated to lead to an increase in the area under cultivation
of 368.3 hectares. This area on average produces about 14.7 metric tonnes of dry opium, which
can be transformed into about 1.2 metric tonnes of heroin or more then six million user doses of
200 mg.22 Another way to grasp the magnitude is that it is 1.56 times the median production
of opium producing districts. Also note that the value of the estimated parameter of lagged
conict on opium production has almost the same numerical value in columns (4), (5), and (6),
i.e. it seems to be very robust to dierent specications. Again, these regressions control for
everything that is constant at the district level, so it is not dierences in levels across dierent
districts that are generating the results. The positive relationship holds also for two-year lags,
but here the eect is not statistically signicant, see column (3).
Which way does the causality go?
A sharp test of the direction of causality is a comparison of the association between conict and
opium production during and directly after the planting season. The reason for this being a
sharp test of our hypothesis, is that if our hypothesis is correct, there should be a discontinuity
at the end of the planting season: conict during the planting season should have a strong eect
22One kg of heroin requires 11-13 kg of opium(UNODC, 2003, p. 133). Doses vary a lot, from 1-5mg for initial
doses to about 1g for very experienced users. The study by Gschwend et al. (2004) reports an average daily
consumption of 474mg among heavy users.
16on opium production, whereas conict once the opium has been planted should have no eect.
All over Afghanistan, opium is planted between September and November. Planting later than
this signicantly reduces yields, and is therefore extremely uncommon (UNODC, 2003, p. 31).
This is also conrmed by agronomic studies; although the optimal planting date depends on
agro-climatic conditions, germination is hindered in early sowing and late sowing leads to too
fast maturity and reduced opium yields (Yadav, 1983, p. 86). By planting 10 days after the
optimal day, yields are reduced by 13 percent (ibid.).
Any eect from opium production to conict, however, should be independent of whether we
are in the planting season or not. If the battles were over the opium territory, warlords would
be equally interested in ghting back in January as in October. For this reason we can threat
conict in the period after the planting season as a placebo, enabling us to identify the direction
of causality between conict and opium production.
In Table 4, Columns (1) (without year xed eects) and (6) (with year xed eects) show
estimates from the same regressions as in Table 3, but now including only casualties from the
planting season. Columns (2) and (7) (without year xed eects) and (3) and (8) (with year
xed eects) measure the eect in the control group, i.e. the eect of conict directly after the
planting season has ended. Columns (2) and (7) include casualties from a period equally long as
the planting season variable. There is less conict in this period than in September to November;
the mean of the conict variables is reported at the bottom of the table. Therefore, we also
try the same experiment using a control period that contains approximately the same level of
conict, shown in Columns (3) and (8). From the Table we see that there is a sharp dierence
in the estimated eect of conict on opium production in the planting season relative to directly
after, the estimated eect in the planting season is strongly signicant and in numerical value
somewhat above what we found in Table 3. The eect of casualties directly after the planting
season is much smaller in numerical value, and it is far from signicant. We have also tried
including both casualties in and out of the planting season, see columns (4) and (5) (without
year xed eects) and (9) and (10) (with year xed eects). The results are again exactly the
same|only conict during the planting season induces opium production.
The same direction of causality is conrmed in Table 5, which shows the results from a
Granger causality test. The two columns shows the results from regressions of current opium
production and conict on one-year lags of the two. Again we see that lagged casualties have
a signicant eect on opium production, whereas lagged opium production has no signicant
eect on conict. We can conclude that conict Granger-causes opium production. In other
words, we can reject that the correlation we observe between conict and subsequent opium
production is caused by Western soldiers going into areas where they have learned that there
is a lot of opium production combined with opium production being positively correlated over
time.
Where is the eect strongest?
Our mechanism should be stronger in areas in which the government has less control and where
it is easier to extract opium prots, i.e. areas in which governmental law enforcement is weak. In
terms of our model, such weak law enforcement is captured by a high level of . The combination
of bad institutions and \lootable" resource rents is emphasized as a special bad case in the
resource curse literature (Mehlum et al., 2006).
To demonstrate that conicts is particularly harmful where governmental law enforcement is
weak, we proxy bad institutions with (altitude-weighted) distance to Kabul. Law enforcement
is clearly best in Kabul, the area in which the government has full control and were there is
a strong presence of Western forces, and declining in the distance from the capital. This is of

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18Table 5: Granger causality test
Opium prod. Casualties
Opium production, lagged 0.643** 0.0000166
(0.250) (0.0000121)




District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 1645 1645
Notes: Eects of lagged Western combat casualties and opium production on current Western
casualties and opium production. Casualties on district level. The equations are estimated using
the Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure, since they contain a lagged endogenous variable on the
right hand side. 2 is the test statistic of a 2 test of lagged casualties being dierent from zero
in column (1) and of lagged opium production being dierent from zero in column (2). p-value
is the p-value of this test.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
the measurement error introduced is non-classical, the estimates can be seen as lower bounds
on the true values. In Table 6 we study the interaction of ghting with the distance to Kabul.
The eect of casualties is stronger further away from Kabul. With an even split between the
half of the districts closest to and furthest away from Kabul, only the furthest half show any
relationship between ghting and opium production. That conicts stimulate opium production
in areas where law enforcement is weak, is clearly in line with our theory.
Conict or just the presence of Western soldiers?
One objection that could be raised to the results reported above is that Western casualties in
a district may be a measure of the presence of Western soldiers rather than the occurrence of
ghting. One mechanism that could generate the positive correlation in Table 3 could be the
following: When Western forces have control over an area, it is easier to smuggle drugs out since
these forces have an explicit policy of not intervening in drugs trade (see quotes above). To
control for this, we separate between the eects of hostile and non-hostile Western casualties.
Non-hostile casualties are events such as car accidents or illness, and indicate the presence of
Western soldiers in a district without indicating occurrences of ghting. We want to test whether
both hostile and non-hostile casualties have an eect on opium production versus the alternative
of only hostile casualties having an eect.
Table 7 reports the results from this analysis. The coecients on hostile casualties are about
the same as in Table 3. The coecients on non-hostile casualties are negative or insignicant,
indicating that there is no eect on opium production from the presence of Western soldiers;
only conict increases subsequent opium production. Also note that the numerical value of
the estimated eect of conict on opium production is almost the same in Table 7 as in Table
3. In the specications where the coecients on non-hostile casualties are signicant, they are
negative. This may indicate that if there are non-hostile casualties in an area, the area has
stronger law enforcement and hence less opium production. Thus, we nd no support for the
hypothesis that there will be an increase in opium production in areas controlled by Western









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Table 7: Eects of Western combat and non-hostile casualties on opium production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hostile casualties 1104.4* 569.1*
(571.4) (303.3)
Hostile casualties, lagged 873.9** 447.9** 340.8** 434.0***
(371.3) (185.3) (138.4) (163.0)
Hostile casualties, two lags 335.2 -63.55
(267.8) (323.3)
Non-hostile casualties -555.0** -29.88
(244.7) (129.8)
Non-hostile casualties, lagged -358.6* 288.8 191.6 103.3
(204.0) (221.0) (210.5) (180.8)
Non-hostile casualties, two lags -348.0* -327.4
(203.0) (205.5)
District FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.031 0.012 0.001 0.008 0.034 0.041
N 2303 1974 1645 1974 1974 1645
Notes: Eects of contemporaneous and lagged Western combat and non-hostile casualties on
opium production (2001-2007). Casualties on district level.
Standard errors are clustered on province-year
4.3 Robustness
Province level data
Table 8 shows the same regressions as in Table 3, but with province level data on casualties.
These estimates benet from the somewhat richer conict data we have on the province level
as some incidents can only be attributed to the province and not the district, and can also take
into account cross-district spillover eects. Opium production is still on district level. Again we
nd strong and positive eects of casualties on opium production, however, the estimates are
somewhat less robust to the inclusion of two-way xed eects than the ones using district level
data. It is important to note that, despite having more data on conict on province level, the 32
provinces23 in Afghanistan are large, with an average of about 10 districts per province, hence
we lose a lot of information by exploiting only the province part of the casualties data.
Correcting simultaneity bias by instrumenting
Another way to tackle the possibility that conict and opium production are simultaneously
determined is through instrumental variables. To formalize, we say that
Cit = ai + bOit + d0Zit + "1
it (5a)
Oit = i + Cit + 0Zit + 0Wit + "2
it (5b)
where Cit is conict, Oit is opium production, Zit is a vector of covariates common to the two
equations, and Wit are covariates unique to equation (5b). Notice that we have imposed an
23After a redistricting, there are now 34 provinces. We use the old denitions to maintain continuity in the
opium production data.
21Table 8: Eects of Western combat casualties on opium production. Casualties measured at the
province level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Casualties, province 318.1** -79.81
(159.9) (115.8)
Casualties, province lagged 387.7* 282.2** 159.6 193.4
(212.5) (138.4) (116.7) (149.7)
Casualties, province two lags 355.6 158.6
(281.1) (169.3)
District FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.019 0.023 0.016 0.016 0.034 0.033
N 2303 1974 1645 1974 1974 1645
Notes: Eects of contemporaneous and lagged Western combat casualties on opium production
(2001-2007). Casualties on province level, opium production on district level.
Standard errors are clustered on province-year
exclusion restriction, namely that Wit only appears in the equation for opium production. This
allow us to use Wit as instruments for Oit, and hence to consistently estimate b in equation (5a).
However, we are mostly interested in estimating , the coecient on conict in the equation
for opium production. The standard order condition tells us that it is not possible to identify
 without either using an instrument for conict in equation (5b) or imposing an additional
restriction. As it seems to be extremely hard to nd a valid (ordinary) instrument for conict we
follow the latter approach, by imposing the restriction that the covariance between "1
it and "2
it is
zero. This essentially requires that there are no common omitted variables to the two equations.
Although this is a strong assumption, the fact that we use two-way xed eects reduces the
problem considerably. Under this restriction, Hausman and Taylor (1983) have shown that a
valid instrument for Cit in equation (5b) is the estimated residuals b "1
it obtained from a 2SLS
regression on equation (5a) with Wit as instruments for opium. Due to the restriction on the
covariance matrix of the errors, b "1
it will be correlated with Cit (from equation (5a)), but will
be uncorrelated with "2
it, i.e. b "1
it satises the standard conditions for being a valid instrumental
variable.
A common instrument for agricultural production in poor countries is deviation from trend
in rainfall (see among others Miguel et al., 2004; Paxson, 1992; Hidalgo et al., forth.). Even
though opium is more drought-resistant than wheat, poppy cultivation, as with the cultivation
of all other crops, requires some water during the growth cycle (Kapoor, 1995, Ch. 4). Therefore,
rainfall is likely to be correlated with opium production. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that
rainfall should have any direct impact on western hostile casualties, justifying the exclusion
restriction imposed in equation (5a). The reason for making the last claim is that conict is
here measured as a dummy for whether there have been hostile casualties in a district on a
yearly basis. Even though deviations from normal rainfall such as snow storms may inuence
the timing of the Western forces' operations somewhat, it seems unlikely that this should have
any eect on whether the operations are implemented or not. Thus, it seems unlikely that
rainfall aects conict directly in our setting.
Table 9 shows results from the instrumental variables regression. Zit contains district and
year xed eects and Wit contains the rainfall variables described in the data section. In columns
(1) and (2) we report standard OLS-estimates for the two equations. We see that both ^ b and ^ 
22are positive and highly signicant. In columns (3) and (4) we control for the simultaneity bias
by estimating the parameters using the Hausman and Taylor (1983) approach. We here see that
the eect of conict on opium (^ ) is still highly signicant, and in numerical value almost equal
to the ones presented in Table 3. The estimated ^ b, however, is diminished by a ten-fold, and is
no longer signicant. This clearly corroborates the ndings above.
An artifact of the change in measurement technology?
Since 2002, the surveying of opium production in some of the districts has been conducted by
satellite imagery. Although it seems that this is mostly due to increased eciency in the data
collection, the initial explanation was that the level of conict in some of the provinces was so
high that is was impossible to survey the production in these areas using on-the-ground sur-
veyors. As the measurement technology may inuence the reported opium production and be
correlated with conict, we run the same regressions as in Table 3, while also controlling for
satellite measurement. The results can be found in Table 10. Column (1) is a dierence in dier-
ences estimation of the impact of measurement by satellite on the measured opium production.
It seems that using satellite measurement tends to increase the measured area under opium pro-
duction. Still, the eect of conict on opium production, reported in Columns (2) to (7), remains
very close to those reported in Table 3, so our ndings are not driven by a spurious eect from
the measurement technology. As the satellite variable is highly endogenous|correlated with
conict since this was the original reason for using satellite, and possibly correlated with opium
production since the production estimates are based on a dierent measurement technology|we
did not include satellite as a separate control in the regressions reported above.
Another worry concerning the measurement of opium production is that the number of
districts surveyed has been increasing over time, especially during the 1990's. Apparently, at
least in the beginning, UNODC only surveyed districts in which they believed there was opium
production. To ensure that the expansion in the number of districts surveyed does not aect our
estimates, we have run the same regressions as in Table 3 using only districts that had positive
opium production in at least one year during the 1990's. The results are literally unchanged,
but as the sample size is reduced, the standard errors increase somewhat (results not shown,
but available on request).
Caused by price movements?
We have not taken price changes into account in the previous estimations. It seems reasonable
to think that the decision to produce opium also depend on the price a farmer gets for his
opium. However, as prices also depend on supply, this is a classical case of an endogenous
variable. One could imagine mechanisms by which the results discussed so far could be driven
by price movements. UNODC (various issues) has collected opium prices from household surveys,
although they are only broken down at the level of six regions. The data are shown if Figure 4.
It is seen that the geographical variation is modest, and that most of the variation comes from
time series variation. Hence the eect of prices is largely picked up by the year dummies in the
preceding estimation. If prices are included in similar analyzes, the conclusions are unchanged,
and prices have no signicant relationship with opium production.24 In addition, from Figure 4
we see that farm gate prices have plunged in the period from 2004 and onward, indicating that
they cannot be an important explanation of the huge increase in opium production. It seems
more reasonable that the recent increase has pushed prices down, if anything.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The graph shows the estimates farm gate value of opium production by year, broken down
by six broad regions.
Driven by a general increase in farming activities?
One nal worry is that the relationship we observe between conict and opium production
reects a general increase in farming activities, due for example to an inux of returnees causing
more land scarcity, which in turn increases opium production. To test this we have collected data
on wheat production, made available by FAO. Unfortunately wheat data are only available on
province level. Running the two-way xed eects model in Table 3 with wheat production rather
than opium production as the dependent variable, we nd no signicant relationship between
the two variables (results not reported). However, we also get insignicant results when running
opium production on casualties on province level after taking out two-way xed eects. Province
level data seems to contain too little geographical information to be able to estimate the eect
of conict precisely (see also the discussion following Table 8). There is almost no correlation
between wheat production and opium production,25 however, indicating that it does not seem
to be the case that the relationship we observe is due to a general increase in farming activities.
25The correlation coecient between wheat and opium production on pooled data is 0.02. Taking out province
xed eects, the partial correlation coecient is 0.01. Taking out year xed eects in addition, reduces the
coecient to -0.05.
265 Conclusion
While most conict studies focus on the behavior of the ghting contestants, we focus more
on the behavior of local leaders and the people living in the conict areas. Afghanistan is a
good example of how rising conicts change their incentives and behaviors. The changes may
come about because conicts are destructive, destroying physical capital and infrastructure,
and because conicts are creative, opening up new opportunities for economic activities. Opium
production in Afghanistan benets on both fronts.
Opium production is less hurt than other activities by the local destructions that conicts
cause; it is less dependent on infrastructure such as roads and irrigation systems and it becomes
more socially feasible as conicts alter local power and moral norms. The new and more exible
interpretations of \legality," combined with the decline in legal opportunities, make opium pro-
duction tempting for many local people who otherwise would be more reluctant to be involved.
We capture some of this in a simple model which is used as a motivation for an empirical
assessment of how conicts induce opium production in Afghanistan. We nd strong support
for our main mechanism. Exploiting a unique data set, we show that Western hostile casualties,
our proxy for conict, have a strong impact on subsequent local opium production. This proxy
is shown to be exogenous to opium, both by statements from US and NATO forces claiming that
they are not involved in military actions against opium producers, and by the zero correlation
between eradication of opium production and Western casualties.
If it was the case that the warlords only fought back in areas with much opium, the positive
correlation between casualties and subsequent opium production could still be observed even
with the placement of the soldiers being random. But there is no support for this story about
defending opium in particular, since we show that hostile casualties only have an eect prior
to the planting season. If the battles were over the opium territory, warlords would be equally
interested in ghting back in January as in October. We therefore conclude that the dramatic rise
in Afghan poppy cultivation in the period 2002-2007 is a direct consequence of the rising violent
conicts in the country. This is why we claim that narcotics production is conict-induced.
We believe that there also is a strong drugs-for-arms mechanism at work in Afghanistan,
although this is not the topic of our paper. Our focus on those conicts that are exogenous
to opium production enables us to identify the link from conict to opium production. Due to
this exogeneity, however, we are unable to quantify the traditional drugs-for-arms mechanism
with our data. If both conict-induced narcotics production and drugs-for-arms mechanisms
are at work at the same time, the combination of the two may create a vicious circle: More
intense conicts stimulate more opium production enabling warlords, militia leaders, and other
strongmen to nance military campaigns escalating the conicts further.
Clearly, opium production creates prot opportunities for local strongmen and warlords.
Large sums of money must be involved from a trade that covers 90 percent of the world's
illegal consumption of opium. This speaks to the current debate on how Afghanistan should
treat warlords and drug trackers who presently prot on the drug trade.26 When eradication
teams moved into the Helmand province, for instance, the governor announced an amnesty
for drug trackers: \We as a government will provide the opportunity to use their money for
the national benet [...] they must invest in industries. They must invest in construction
companies" (quoted in MacDonald (2007, p. 97)). We do not know whether amnesty is a good
solution to Afghanistan's opium related development crisis. What we do claim, however, is that
the local insecurity in the country has detrimental eects on local investments, which in turn
induce even higher opium production.
26See Grossman and Mej a (2008) for an analysis of the eectiveness of anti-drug policies in the case of Colombia.
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